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Handling China delicately
August 18, 2005
Australia acknowledges China's regional aspirations, but America has concerns about its growth in power, writes Hugh White.
We often speak of our alliance with America as based on shared values, and indeed it is. But there are important differences in the way our two countries think about values, and especially about the linkage between values and power. That difference is central to our thinking about the future of Asia.
John Howard, visiting Washington last month, starkly displayed these differences when he and President George Bush spoke on the touchstone issue of China.
Standing next to Howard, Bush described America's relations with Beijing as "complex" and "complicated". "We've got issues when it comes to values," he said, and asked Howard to "work together to reinforce the need for China to accept certain values as universal."
Howard turned him down, flat. He told Bush: "We have a good relationship with China. It's not just based on economic opportunity. We are unashamed in developing our relations with China. I'll do everything I can in the interests of Australia to ensure it develops further."
The day before, he had said his approach was "to build on the things that we have in common, and not become obsessed with the things that make us different".
That harsh word "obsessed" points to the depth of the differences here. For Howard, values and power can be treated separately. He acknowledges that China and Australia have different values, but he does not see those differences as a barrier to the growth of a bilateral relationship that goes beyond economics to encompass politics and even security issues.
Crucially, he does not agree with Bush that China's social and political values undermine its claims to regional power. He accepts those claims as legitimate. Indeed he thinks that China's ascent to some kind of economic and political leadership in Asia is in Australia's interest. That is why he is going to the East Asian Summit.
For Bush, and for most Americans, the opposite is true. They are keen to benefit from China's growing economy. But they do not accept China's claim for a share of power in Asia, because they believe that only countries that share America's values can legitimately exercise such power. The Chinese suspect that this talk of values is just a fig leaf for American power politics, pure and simple.
Perhaps. But my guess is that the power and values are so deeply intertwined in American thinking that they cannot be separated.
Americans are complicated people. "Obsessed" might not be too strong a word.
Now the differences are clear, the question is whether the two allies are going to just agree tacitly to differ, or are going to do something about it. The temptation is strong to just let things lie, because, as Howard says, a US-China conflict is not inevitable.
But hoping for the best is not good policy. We can't assume that the US and China will work these issues out between themselves. If we want to maximise our chances that 20 years from now we can enjoy strong relations with both the US and with China, there are three key questions that we in Australia need to consider.
First, we need to decide just how far we are willing to go in accepting Chinese leadership in Asia. Clearly we are happy to see China's influence grow. But presumably we would not want China to become a dominant regional hegemonic power. Where in between does the limit lie?
This question is becoming urgent, because we have started encouraging China down the road to regional influence without knowing how far we want them to go.
Second, we need to decide what role we want America to play in the new balance of power in Asia. Clearly we want the US to stay engaged, to balance China and prevent it dominating the region.
But the implication of Canberra's support for Chinese regional leadership is that the US will need to concede some power and influence to China, because competition for strategic influence is a zero-sum game. So how much power and influence do we want the US to concede to China? What kind of residual role do we want the US to play? And what are the chances of America being happy to accept that role?
Third, how do other regional powers fit in? In particular, what role does Japan have in Asia's new power structure? Sixty years after the end of the Pacific war, it is clear that Japan cannot and should not be denied forever a normal role in the strategic affairs of Asia, especially if China's power grows. If America's role is reduced, are we happy to see Japan's role increased?
Of course, all these questions connect. Australia, by its support for China's growing regional influence, is promoting a profound transformation in the strategic architecture of Asia, with immense implications for Australia's future security, including our alliance with the US. Australia needs to consider what the possible outcomes of that process might be, and which of those outcomes would be best for us.
For what it's worth, my hunch is that Australia's interests would be best served if the US would allow China a somewhat bigger regional role, in return for China allowing Japan a larger say in regional affairs.
That would be a very different region from the one we live in at the moment — and full of new challenges for Australia. We seem a long way from it now, but things are moving very quickly. We need to get our act together.
The first essential step is to start a very frank discussion with Washington, in which the big questions of power and values are put squarely on the table.
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Hugh White is a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute and professor of strategic studies at ANU.
