… a Short History of …
By Christina D. Spink. 2000.
Expanded Historical
Context
Japanese Presence in China
A continued Japanese presence in China began
at the end of the nineteenth Century. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Japan invaded
Shantung and Manchuria in its dispute with China over
the control of Korea. Following its decisive victory, Japan received
the most-favored-nation status that had been extended to Britain,
France and
the United States in 1843-44. Japan's new status and the opening of four more ports
to trade, created an "imperialist scramble" on the part of Britain,
Germany, Russia, France and Japan to partition China into "spheres of
influence." Germany, "taking advantage of the murder in Shantung
of two German Roman Catholic missionaries," seized Tsingtao, forcibly
leased territory in Kiaochow, and was assured railway
and mining rights in Shantung Province. [1]
In 1899 in the Shantung Province,
flood and famine combined with local unrest against the German and foreign
presence to create an uprising which culminated in the Boxer Rebellion. National
feelings were strong against missionaries, particularly Catholics, who were
seen as foreign agents after an imperial rescript gave Bishops privilege to
seek interviews and rank with viceroys and governors, and to have certain civil
jurisdiction over their converts. The climax came in Peking in 1900 when
missionaries, Chinese Christians and foreign diplomats were besieged in the
legation quarter of Peking for forty-five days until relieved by an international expedition. [2]
Because they were scattered throughout China,
rather than concentrated in the port cities, missionaries received the brunt of
the hostilities. Approximately one hundred and eighty-seven Protestant
missionaries were killed during the Rebellion. "Of these, slightly more
than a third were under the China Inland Mission and its associated
societies." Though twenty-one were CIM children, the Chefoo School was
spared any bloodshed. In keeping with their total reliance on God to provide,
the mission that suffered the most loss refused not only to "enter any
claim against the Chinese government, but to refrain from accepting
compensation even if offered. [3]
The years after the
Boxer Rebellion were fruitful and saw expansion of the missionary movement and
the establishment of Western education in China. Even
the disorder of the Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the Republic
did not interfere substantially with mission work or the security of the
Westerner. "Both Manchus and revolutionists were
eager not to offend the foreigner for fear that the Western powers would
support their opponents." [4] This
protected status would soon come to an end.
During World War One, while the rest of
the foreign powers were busy fighting each other, Japan
presented its twenty-one demands to China. Divided
into five sections, the first two sections of the twenty-one demands called for
recognition of Japanese rights in Shantung, Mongolia and Manchuria. Japan declared war on Germany
in August of 1914 and by November had seized Germany's
holdings in Shantung. After the First World War, Shantung Province was
assigned to Japan by the Treaty of Versailles in which China had
no say and therefore refused to sign. However, the Washington
conference of 1922 made Japan restore its holdings in Shantung to China. Japan acquiesced, but still maintained a presence in the Province. Despite
the return of Shantung Province to China's control, China was still obligated to the extraterritoriality of the Western
powers. This Western presence contributed to continued unrest among Chinese
student and political groups. [5]
After the First World War, Western
prestige and power in China had changed. No longer could the Western powers jointly impose
their will on China. The groundwork had been laid for domestic forces to emerge. By the
mid-Twenties, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang Nationalist
Party (KMT), led by Sun Yat-sen, were functioning. As
the Chinese political parties developed, agitation increased against the
foreign presence, especially that of the British and the Japanese. With the
rise of Chinese nationalism, anti-imperialist and anti-Christian demonstrations
grew. These uprisings peaked in 1927, but by then many of the missionaries, as
advised by their consuls, had evacuated interior China for the port cities, or
had left China altogether.
Although the persecution was not as
drastic as that of the Boxer Rebellion, it was more widespread and the prospect
for a semblance of peace seemed remote. One reason restoration of order seemed
unobtainable was due, in part, to the continued unrest between the KMT and the CCP. By 1928
the KMT had formed a national government in Nanking. However, warlordism, a
continued Communist presence in the rural areas and the KMT's own factions
prevented true unification of China.[6] The
rise of Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the KMT and his
anti-Communist movement eventually split the party after much bloodshed, most
notably in Nanking and Shanghai. Chiang then established a government in Nanking.
While Chiang pursued the Communists, Japan
sent troops into Shantung. Japan justified its action as protecting Japanese lives and property from
the strong anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist feelings of the Chinese, which
often erupted into strikes and protests. The clash of Japanese and nationalist
forces only intensified anti-Japanese sentiments, especially as Japan
reoccupied part of Shantung. Acting out of its own sense of "manifest destiny," Japan
seized Manchuria in 1931. The Japanese considered China a
"backward and disorganized nation, victimized by the Western powers,"
[7] and felt they had a duty to dominate East Asia. That domination
included Manchuria with its relatively unpopulated territory, which could easily be
settled by Japan.
China
sought help from the League of Nations to oust Japan, but no significant enforceable action was taken. Japan
resigned from the League, the clashes continued, and Manchuria became Manchuko. By
1933, Japan and China signed a truce that left Japan in control
of the area north of the Great Wall. Intent on wiping out the Communists, but
knowing that his troops were inferior to Japan's, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a
policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance," to
buy time to prepare his army and to rout the Communist threat to his power. This
policy, however, did not endear Chiang to his own people. "While the
Chinese disliked the Kuomingtang, they hated the Japanese more.... In a
paradoxical way, therefore, the Japanese threat may have been a significant
reason why Chiang Kai-shek's regime survived the period 1931 1934." [8] Any further revolutionary upheaval would only
have invited increased aggression from Japan.
In the early 1930's, Shantung province went through
a civil war between two warlords. After the civil war, Han Fu-chu, the winner, "apparently
reached an understanding with the Japanese that he would remain neutral if the
Japanese attacked Peiping, Tientsin or other areas in North China. In return, the Japanese agreed to spare Shantung." [9] On July 7, 1937, after provocation by both sides,
war broke out between Japan and China when Japan came south and attacked at the
Marco Polo Bridge and then occupied Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and by December
of 1937, Nanking.
Chiang's Nationalist government fled to Chungking, which was not under
Japanese occupation. Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of trading territory for time
meant that he accepted the loss of large areas of North and Central China. By 1938, the
Chinese defended positions in the hills and mountains where the motorized
Japanese army could not easily penetrate. The Japanese countered by occupying
the coastal areas and causing economic strangulation for the interior. So the
lines between the two combatants remained essentially in a stalemate battle of
attrition until mid-1944. And, by 1940, Japan
sought imperial expansion into other areas. [10]
Formation of Weihsien
Internment Camp
While the Chefoo group was interned in
Temple Hill, the rest of the Westerners in North
China were increasingly restricted to
their houses or settlement areas until large scale internment could be
accomplished. Washington received word of the impending internment through a telegram
reading: "Japanese Consulates in North
China to inform all enemy nationals in North China that they are to be
sent for concentration to Weihsien, Shantung. This is to take place about the middle of March." A later
telegram confirms the impending internment but adds that "those assembled
at Chefoo will remain there." Chefoo in this case referred to Temple Hill,
which was located in Chefoo. [11]
Of the larger camps in China,
Weihsien was one of the most adequate. Prior to becoming an internment camp,
Weihsien had been a large American Presbyterian Mission school, seminary and
hospital two miles east of Weihsien city. In 1943 Weihsien, with compound space
of 200 yards by 150, became the internment camp for 1,700 people from the
regions of Peking, Tientsin, Tsingtao, and Chefoo. After the transfer of the Catholics, and "the
repatriation of a majority of the Americans and Canadians at Weihsien, there remained
about 1,400 internees.... There were 202 United States, 1,093 British, 42 Belgians, 28 Dutch, and 58 other nationals them,
of whom 358 were children." [12]
Confined to an area about the size of
five large city blocks, surrounded by a high brick wall, living space was at a
premium. Families, which were the majority of the internee population, were
housed in former Chinese student moms which were 12'6" x 8'11". Each
room, suitable for two persons, now had to hold three and sometimes four
people. Single men and women lived in groups of ten to fifteen in the
classrooms and offices of the school buildings. Nine buildings, including the
hospital, were used as dormitories. The internees also had use of a church, a
tennis court, a small playing field for softball, baseball and field hockey,
and a basketball court which was also used for volleyball. When the Chefoo
group first arrived, they were housed in the moms if they were families, but
most were placed in the dormitories. [13]
The first group to be interned at
Weihsien was from Tsingtao. They had been interned in the Iltis-Hydro
Hotel in Tsingtao since October 27, 1942. They left Tsingtao and arrived in
Weihsien on the same day, March 20, 1943. The Peking and Tientsin American
and British nationals were informed on March 12, 1943
that in two weeks they would be interned in Weihsien as well. Because the
groups from these two areas were rather large, 780 from Tientsin and 485 from Peking, the two groups were
divided into sections of approximately 200, with their departure days
staggered. They would arrive in Weihsien one day after their departure. [14]
The groups began departing on March 22, 1943. When the Tsingtao group arrived in Weihsien,
“… no
kitchens were operating and nothing was organized, nor had any other group
arrived. We had to start things going, especially in the kitchen. In fact, the
Japanese admitted they were not quite ready for us, and sanitary conditions, we
soon learned, gave all too much emphasis to their admission. Morning roll call
ensued; otherwise the guards left us much to ourselves.” [15]
By March 31, 1943,
the last group had arrived at Weihsien, or "Courtyard of the Happy Way,"
the name by which the mission had been known. The camp internees were informed
that by April 2, a permanent committee with nine chairmen must be set up. The
nine committees were discipline, education, employment, engineering and
repairs, finance, food supplies, general affairs, medical affairs, and
quarters. It was also decided to divide the camp into the four groups
represented, the fourth group being the nearly 500 Catholic fathers, brothers
and sisters. Each group was then told to select one representative to serve for
each committee. By the end of May a general election was held for committee
members, most of whom retained their positions. [16]
The Japanese garrison at Weihsien camp
consisted of a Commandant, his staff of five, and then thirty to forty Japanese
Consular Police. There were very few incidents between the Japanese and the
internees, who were given practical autonomy in the direction of their affairs.
"The average internee saw little of the Japanese Camp Commandant or his
staff, who left the running of the camp almost entirely in the hands of the
Committee, to whom he issued orders and from whom he received requests and
complaints." [17]
Internment Camps in China
In general, the civilian internment camps
in China were humanely run, with cold weather, overcrowding, and scarcity of
food toward the end of the war being the major concerns. The internees were
expected to maintain the camps and did the central cooking themselves. There
was no forced labor and each camp was expected to form nine committees to
represent the internees' needs to the Japanese, to handle internal affairs and
to run the whole camp. Many of the camps were also allowed to have recreational
activities such as concerts, dances and theater, as well as religious services
and educational studies. Medical treatment was generally good because some of
the internees were medical missionaries. Also, the Red Cross and the Swiss
Consul at times supplied the camps with medicine and money. It is believed that
the camps in China were more humane because they were under the supervision of the
various Japanese consular offices rather than under the Imperial Japanese Army.
[18]
Education at Weihsien
Of special interest is the formation of
schools in Weihsien prior to the arrival of the Chefoo group. All of the
information is derived from Sokobin's November 11, 1943 report. The head of the Education Committee was a Britisher who had
previously been with the Tientsin Grammar School. The committee organized the children into groups.
At the pre-school and
kindergarten age there were approximately ninety students who were then divided
into age appropriate groupings from three to six years old.
On the elementary
level, two schools evolved. The American School derived
from the Peking American School with its teachers, and the British School was
made up of teachers from the Tientsin Grammar School. The two schools went from grades one through eight or the
comparable forms on the British side, and had between them one hundred students
and sixteen teachers. At the high school level, a British and an American
school also existed following the respective systems. There were approximately
fifteen teachers for the seventy-five students in the secondary schools.
Adult education also thrived.
"Amongst the Catholic Fathers, the educationalists from the Peking universities and the
language students, we had some of the finest intellects in North China, and lectures and
talks were given on every imaginable subject." Ninety teachers taught more
than 700 students in 25 subjects which included art, botany, ornithology,
physics, chemistry, English, Chinese, French, German, Spanish, Russian,
Japanese, Latin, Greek, philosophy, psychology, theology, commercial subjects,
vocal and theoretical music, and higher mathematics. [19]
Clandestine Activities
The black market had been most
effectively run by the Catholic Fathers in order to provide eggs and other
necessities for the mothers with young children. Once the Fathers were
transferred to Peking, other groups and individuals established contacts with the Chinese
over the camp wall for the provision of goods. Eventually an electrified,
barbed- wired fence was erected which slowed, but did not stop, the
marketeering. Another priest, De Jaegher, devised
various means for making contacts and relaying messages outside the camp. Primarily
he relied on the Chinese coolies who came in the camp each day to clean out the
cesspools, or on the postman who made weekly visits to the camp. De Jaegher joined internee Laurance
Tipton in devising a plan to escape from the camp. [20]
Over time the two men
began collecting maps and information about the location of Communist,
Japanese, Nationalist and guerrilla forces. This information was supplied through
the cesspool coolies. It took a year to gather information and make plans to escape.
By the spring of 1944 the camp committee had been in contact with a Nationalist
military, or "Chungking," unit. The commander of the unit proposed to rescue the internees
but only if they could arrange for their consuls to send planes to remove them from
the area. The committee replied that such an operation would not be practical
due to the large number of women, children, aged and sick. Tipton and De Jaegher then sought and established contact with guerrilla
troops under the direction of Commander Wang. [21]
On the Friday night of June 9, 1944, two men escaped from Weihsien, Laurance
Tipton and Arthur Hummel. As much as De Jaegher
wanted to go, he was begged not to by one of his superiors in the camp who
feared reprisals against innocent people in camp. So Hummel went in De Jaegher's place. The men were not reported as missing until
the next day's roll call. "The nine men who shared their bachelor
dormitory were arrested, placed in the church building for ten days and
subjected to prolonged interrogation." Roll call was now held both morning
and evening, and food supplies took a further cutback. [22]
The most drastic reprisal for the escape
was that the remaining internees had to change their living quarters. The
bachelors who lived in the top floor of the hospital were moved into block 23
where the Chefoo students had been. The students were moved to the top floor of
the hospital where they now had a view over the wall. The staff of Chefoo was
reluctant to move as it meant moving almost all of the children. But one of the
teachers, Marjorie Broomhall, reminded them, "Don't let us dig in our
heels and refuse; every move so far had turned out to be God's way of providing
some better thing for us." So the move was efficiently carried out in a
few hours and the new accommodations, "with the girls on one floor and the
boys above, . . . [made] a united family again under
the same roof." [23]
About three months after the escape, De Jaegher received word from Tipton and Hummel through the
coolies. From this connection, coded messages were relayed as to the progress of
the war. The fact that "two men had got away and were now free and able to
get word to us and receive news from us made our incarceration less binding and
onerous." Tipton and Hummel had aligned themselves with the guerrilla
Commander Wang, and established radio contact with Chungking. From there, their
reports were sent on to Washington urging the supplying of Commander Wang with ammunition to safeguard
the Allied nationals in Weihsien. [24]
Tipton and Hummel were also able to
smuggle four crates of medicines, dropped by an American B-24, to Mr. Egger,
the Swiss Consul at Tsingtao. Mr. Egger then had a list of all the drugs that could be purchased
in Tsingtao typed out, but with spaces of four lines between each item. He took
this list to the office of Japanese consular police for seals of approval. Once
that was obtained, he typed in the names of the other medicines from the four
crates in the blank spaces. The guards at Weihsien allowed the medicines to
come into the camp because the list had the official Japanese consular seal. [25]
#
1 Hilda Hookham, A Short History of China (New York: New American Library, 1972); C. Schiroknauer, Modern China and
Japan (New York: Harcourt, 1982);
Latourette, 489.
2 Hookham; Latourette; Schiroknauer.
3 Latourette,
517; Broomhall, 257.
4 Latourette,
609.
5 Schiroknauer,
Stokesbury.
6 Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan (Boston: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard
University, 1991); Hookham; Latourette;
Schirokauer.
7. Coble, 18.
8 Ibid.,
241; Ibid., quoting Lloyd E. Eastman, 35.
9 Ibid.,
130.
10. Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1984); Stokesbury.
11 Vincent, Letter from American
Embassy, Chungking to Secretary of State, March 11, 1943, RG 389, be 1240,
"Camp Reports China, NA; T. J. Harrison, "American Interests - China, Letter from
Bern, to Secretary of State, March 26, 1943, RG 389 "Camp Reports China, NA.
12 Cotton, 2; David Michell, A Boy's War; Waterford, 1994.
13 Egger, "Report of American
Interests - China, Transmission Camp Report No. 2, Weihsien Camp, March 9,
1944, RG 389, box 2140, "China," NA;
Cotton, 9.
14 Sokobin,
Internment of Americans and Allied Nationals at Weihsien, Nov. 11, 1943,
RG 389, box
2140, "Camp Reports China, NA.
15 Nathan E. Walton, "Internee
Journal," China's Millions, 52, 1944, 25-28.
16 Gilkey; Sokobin,
Internment of Americans and Allied Nationals at Weihsien, Nov.11, 1943, RG 389,
box 2140, "Camp Reports China, NA.
17 Tipton, 77.
18 Waterford; Gilkey.
[19]Tipton, 77; Sokobin,
Internment of Americans and Allied Nationals at Weihsien, Nov. 11, 1943, RG
389, box 2140, "Camp Reports China, NA, 21.
20 Tipton; De Jaegher
& Kuhn, 255-256.
[21]De Jaegher & Kuhn, 257; Tipton, 97.
[22]De Jaegher
& Kuhn, 259; Cliff, 90; Michell, A Boy's War, 99.
[23]Martin,
(1992), 52; Judd, (1954), 4.
[24]De Jaegher
& Kuhn, 261; Hurley, Paraphrase of telegram from American Embassy Chungking
to Secretary of State, May 26, 1945, RG 389, box 2140, "China", NA, 2.