POSTSCRIPT

AND NOW?

THE position throughout North China at the time of the Japanese surrender on 17th August 1945 was similar, in varying degrees, to that of Shantung. The Japanese had control of the railways and some of the more important roads, with garrisons at a few of the larger provincial towns in the interior. Few pro-Chungking guerrillas in North China had survived the latter years of the war, and with these exceptions there remained only the puppet forces that had existed by co-operation with the Japanese, and even these had been greatly reduced in numbers by the inroads of the Communists, who now held the predominant position not only in Shantung but over the whole of North China.

The Japanese surrender was offered to and accepted by the Nationalists as represented by the Chinese Central Government in the war-time capital of Chungking. One of the most important terms of the surrender was the stipulation that the Japanese forces in the field were to retain their armaments and maintain their current military positions until such time as the Central Government troops were in a position to accept their surrender. They were instructed to co-operate with the puppet troops and the few remaining guerrillas in protecting lines of communication from the Communists.

The Communists refused to recognise the surrender of the Japanese to the Chinese Central Government, and demanded a separate treaty of surrender, declaring that until this was concluded they would consider the Communist party as still being at war with Japan. No separate surrender terms were made, and the Communists then pressed for the right to accept the Japanese surrender and disarmament in the areas under their control.

Continuing their policy of expansion, the Communists concentrated on the puppet forces which formed the outer perimeter of all Japanese garrison points, and the guard at some of the smaller railway stations. They soon succeeded in reducing these forces to such an extent that they had virtual control over the whole of North China, with the exception of the larger towns on the railways. The Japanese, for their part, did little but protect their own lives by barricading themselves into their strongly fortified garrisons both day and night, and defending themselves against Communist attacks. This left the intermediate sections of the railways unprotected, and, within a month of the Japanese surrender, the Communists had played such havoc with communications that there was not one stretch of railway operating in North China over a distance of more than twenty to thirty miles. Having successfully crippled all rail transportation through-out North China and thus prevented the movement by rail of the Nationalist troops into North China, the Communists succeeded in gaining even further time to consolidate their position in the North.

Meanwhile, the Russians had swept through Manchuria from the Siberian border to the old Russian treaty port of Port Arthur, accepting the surrender of the famed Japanese Kwan Tung army together with their armament and equipment practically intact. With the Russian occupation of Manchuria, the Chinese Communists in North China experienced no little encouragement, and it was not long before material support was added to moral uplift.

The Nationalists, with large troop concentrations south of the Yellow River and with no possibility of rail transportation to the North, were in an extremely vulnerable position. They had insufficient air transport to be effective, and the only alternative was to march on foot, fighting their way north against Communist opposition — this certain divisions did, but it was a slow process when time was such an important factor. Finally it was agreed that American planes should fly Chinese occupational forces into the more important of the North China cities, and at the same time large American forces were landed by boat in Tsingtao and Tientsin, where they proceeded, with the Chinese, to accept the instrument of Japanese surrender and to organise the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians.

The comparatively small numbers of Chinese troops that were flown into North China had little effect, other than that of morale, in the protection of these towns from the possibility of Communist attacks, and only the American forces prevented their occupation by the Communists — not by active resistance but by their mere presence.

After the acceptance of the surrender of the various Japanese military zones in North China at Peking, Tientsin, Tsingtao and Tsinan, the Japanese troops on the spot were confined to barracks pending repatriation, but there were still large isolated groups of Japanese in the interior, surrounded by Communists and unable or unwilling to proceed to their Headquarters. A few groups, rather than surrender, joined the Communists, and it was well into 1946 before the remainder were satisfactorily accounted for.

The Chinese, as a whole, acted with remarkable restraint towards the Japanese soldiers and civilians, there being few cases of violence. Gradually the Japanese civilians were concentrated in specified areas pending return to their own country. The efficiency with which this repatriation was carried out under difficult circumstances was a most creditable performance on the part of the American armed forces. A year after the termination of war in the Pacific, almost the entire Japanese population of China, together with the Japanese troops, had been transported back to Japan.

The Japanese surrender left Wang Shang-chih occupying Tsoshan and in command of the Japanese garrison there, with Yu-min in a similar position at Kaomi, some twenty-five miles further to the east, where he had firmly re-established himself in a small area over which his 44th regiment still maintained control. Conditions were more favourable in this area under Yu-min, and as the Communists pressed in on Tsoshan, so Wang Shang-chih's followers deserted him and rejoined Yu-min. Within two or three months Wang Shang-chih retired from his post as Garrison Commander at Tsoshan to the provincial capital, Tsinan — leaving his few troops that remained in charge of his Regimental Commander. Early in 1946, the Communists defeated the remnants and occupied Tsoshan.

In the spring of '46 I met Yu-min in Tsingtao and returned with him to Kaomi for a few days. The situation was serious, the Communists had closed in on the 44th, and they were now confined to an area within a few miles of the city. Nationalist troops were stationed together with Yu-min's, but they had little experience of guerrilla warfare and were consequently not accustomed to the hit-and-run tactics and night attacks of the Communists, as were Yu-min's troops. There was jealousy and lack of co-operation.

Yu-min was still the active force behind this remnant of the Fifteenth, but there was little of the old fire and enthusiasm amongst the troops whom we had so much admired during the days when it was a matter of outwitting the Japanese. Many of his former followers tired and disillusioned after eight years of war, were not prepared to continue the struggle against their own people, and had retired to the comforts of Tsingtao and Tsinan. Yu-min himself was far from optimistic, and did not expect to be able to hold on to his position indefinitely unless reinforcements were sent from Tsingtao.

I was not surprised, a few days after my return to Tsingtao, to receive a telephone call from Yu-min's representative in that city to tell me that word had just come to hand of the Communists' attack on Kaomi. For two days there was no news. It was feared that Yu-min had been either captured or killed. On the third day a few stragglers arrived at Tsingtao and told of the occupation of Kaomi by the Communists; Yu-min was wounded, but there was no further news. Late that evening the telephone rang — Yu-min, though wounded, had succeeded in reaching Weihsien in safety. The following day he flew to Tsinan to interview the Provincial Governor, and to have his wounded leg attended to.

The Fifteenth were now completely shattered. The survivors dispersed to Weihsien and Tsingtao — this surely was the end of a most earnest and patriotic unit and its leader. But within ten days Yu-min had flown back to Tsingtao: indefatigable in spirit, he engaged in plans with the Nationalists for an organised drive against the Communists to reopen the railway. Yu-min is only one of many whose deep-rooted hatred of the Communists, derived from years of conflict and personal experiences, makes a peaceful solution to this problem hardly possible.

By the late spring of '46, the Communists had almost complete control of the railway with the exception of Tsingtao, Tsinan and Weihsien, and attacks were constantly made against these three cities, but at no time did they succeed in anything more serious than skirmishes in the outlying suburbs. However, the economic situation in these cities, as in many others in North China, suffered from the Communist blockade and the resultant difficulty in the provision of adequate food. Large sections of the railway were completely destroyed; stations were burned to the ground, rails were removed altogether for miles on end, bridges had been blown up and the rail embankment severed by enormous trenches dug right through the width of the rail-bed.

Nationalist troops in large numbers were now beginning to arrive in North China and Manchuria by boat from the south. Their advance into the interior was not always opposed by the Communists, who avoided open conflict but harried their communication lines and spread subtle and effective anti-Nationalist propaganda. The Nationalists sought open battle, where the superiority of their armaments, for the most part the latest American equipment, gave them the upper hand. As the Communists withdrew, so they destroyed anything of value.

A trail of Communist despoliation lies over the whole of North China from Suiyuan to Shantung, marking their desperate efforts to expand the military power of their party, knowing full well that this is still the deciding factor in Chinese politics. Destruction of communications, flooding of mines and the wreckage of machinery, violent and bloody skirmishes all over North China, were bringing to a head this struggle of almost twenty years' duration against the dynastic dictatorship of the one-party Kuomintang rule.

The United States, which took over the responsibility of the war in the China theatre, was soon deeply involved in her internal politics. 'The avowed aim of American policy is the establishment of a democratic state of government. With this end in view she has intervened on the side of the officially recognised Nationalist Government a government that won and maintained its power by military force. Prosecution of the war effort necessitated negotiations with the Communists, and contact with this party brought doubts as to the soundness of the American view — since when, although American policy has remained pre-eminently pro-Chungking, it has varied from time to time in the strength and directness of its measure of support to the Nationalists.

The post-war political crisis in China has proved a hard testing ground for American foreign policy, which has shown, if not polished diplomacy, at least realistic understanding of the facts. But her tacit recognition of the Communist party's claims, by the advocacy of a coalition government, has not enhanced her standing with the Nationalists, who are inclined to resent the forcing of their legally constituted government to negotiate with those whom they regard as armed rebels.

In the final analysis, America, and for that matter Great Britain also, is concerned primarily with the establishment in China of a government in accord with the so-called democratic bloc, as opposed to a government under the auspices of Russia.

The American "occupation" of China, and consequent intervention in her internal political affairs, must in time almost inevitably react to the disadvantage of the intervener already there are signs of "ingratitude".

Great Britain, deeply occupied in her own affairs, re-occupied Hong Kong, and with that ceased to take any further active interest in the Chinese problem. There are no British troops in China to cause friction, and business is marking time; many of the old Consular staff have returned to resume their happy state of pre-war hibernation. On the surface this may appear very dull and unenterprising, but there will be a swing of the pendulum, and it is not improbable that when that occurs Britain will reap the benefit of her present policy of apparent detachment.

THE END

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